Saturday, August 18, 2007

Do we really have a hiring freeze?

IC has learned through reliable sources that in fact, the CCB has been bringing in HVAC and Carpentry people in through the basement. As a matter of fact, if you look to the Indy Star classifieds, you will see these positions advertised in open media.

What this current administration has got to begin to realize is there is no place to lie and hide any more, our fingers are all over this city. Bart Peterson called for an immediate hiring freeze, and announced that in the national media. IC wants to know who came up with the idea at the City County Building to end around their boss, or if he even knows what actually occurs in his own administration?

In particular, some might take a hard look at the 23rd floor and wonder who the paid consultants are, and what their purpose is? But IC digresses, we would have to know what a line item on the budget "Other" with 300% spending increases represents? Maybe we could fill in those 5 blank pages on the budget from last year with this information?

As always, we are active and aware, and working hard on new pending items for later next week. We just wanted to make sure you know that we haven't taken our eye off the ball in the process. Leads continue to come in to us daily, some of them are better than others. But we encourage any of you who want to share, to email

Friday, August 17, 2007

Hold onto your hat folks, next week may blow some minds!

IC has gone to great pains to start researching some far reaching corruption in our local government, our moles are meeting, our crack staff is researching, and what we're coming up with is beyond comprehension. I wish that we could offer more on this right now, however, it will be no earlier than late next week to put all of this together. In the end, our hope is a long line of orange jump suits. IC can say this much, if we used just the information we have now, we could easily unite some resources and bring some of them down. However, we want them all, not just the small fish and we have to be iron clad in our fact presentation.

So you'll have to wait while we work it out, as soon as we can release some information to you, we will.

Us "Haters and Whiners" made our point (s)

So some folks apparently took it a little far with some of the comments, IC sent a couple of email messages into the show. The first one asked if was only going to lob Bart soft balls today, then offered him a couple of questions.

1) How many deputy Mayors does the mayor require?

IC sent him one more, then sat back and listened to him "Amos" stew about it while Bart was on there. I guess quiet a few must have taken up the cause, as he was very agitated and said we were the black on black haters? Huh? IC is not a black man, or a cop, just wanted him to ask some reasonable questions of the Mayor.

2) The second email we sent asked him, because he said "the mayor did" that he had made a mistake not getting out in front of the people. Why he refuses to go on the Garrison show?

Congrats to everyone who emailed, and pissed him off! Of course they immediately turned this into a race issue, someone must have sent him a question wanting to know if the mayor had seen the "Bart Lies" t-shirts and bumper stickers. He keeps babbling on about some monkey photo?? Can someone tell me about that?

Is he talking about the Minority report, and bartlies??

Haith sure didn't win many cases?

How did he become qualified to be the CCC attorney? Solid work like this:




Marion County Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana

Indianapolis, Indiana


Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana





Appellant-Defendant, )


vs. ) No. 49A04-0211-CR-561




Appellee-Plaintiff. )


The Honorable William Young, Judge

Cause No. 49G20-0106-CF-142462

July 11, 2003


RILEY, Judge


Appellant-Defendant, Maurice Davis (Davis), appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class A felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1.

We affirm.


Davis raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court properly admitted Indianapolis Police Department Drug Task Force Sergeant Steven Kinkade’s testimony into evidence; and

2. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for possession of cocaine with the intent to deliver.


On June 28, 2001, Indianapolis Narcotics Detective Steven Gorgiveski (Detective Gorgiveski) and Indianapolis Police Department Officers Ball, Brannon, and Campbell worked a special detail in the area of Broadway and College Avenue in Indianapolis, Indiana due to a high number of complaints for gambling and narcotic sales. Specifically, Detective Gorgiveski and Officer Ball responded to a report of narcotic sales on Broadway near 30th Street.

When Detective Gorgiveski and Officers Ball, Brannon, and Campbell arrived at a house located at 3048 Broadway, they observed a group of six or seven people drinking. After watching the subjects bend or crouch down for a while, the officers also believed that they were gambling. Detective Gorgiveski and Officer Ball approached the group of people, while Officers Campbell and Brannon positioned themselves behind the car. At this time, Davis stood up and the officers heard the dice hit the ground. Davis also dropped two clear plastic baggies, containing a substance suspected to be cocaine, and a bottled water. Additionally, there was an assortment of U.S. currency on the ground near the two plastic baggies of cocaine, bottled water, and dice.

As a result, Detective Gorgiveski arrested Davis. Davis advised Detective Gorgiveski that the contraband did not belong to him and that he was on probation. The evidence, i.e., cocaine, money, and bottled water, was photographed. Eventually, the suspected cocaine was transported to the narcotics vault. After stipulation from both parties, the substance was identified as cocaine, with a total weight of 5.6225 grams.

On June 29, 2001, the State filed an information against Davis charging him with Count I, possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class A felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-1, and Count II, possession of cocaine, a Class C felony, I.C. § 35-48-4-6. On September 5, 2002, Davis waived his right to trial by jury. On September 9, 2002, a bench trial was held. The trial court found Davis guilty as charged and merged Count II into Count I for sentencing. On October 25, 2002, Davis was sentenced to the Indiana Department of Correction for a period of forty years.

Davis now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.


    1. Admissibility of Sergeant Kinkade’s Testimony

Davis argues that the trial court erred by admitting Kinkade’s testimony into evidence. Specifically, Davis maintains that Kinkade was not a qualified expert witness under Indiana Evidence Rule 702. Therefore, Davis asserts that the trial court erred by allowing Kinkade to express his opinion as to Davis’ thinking or intent with respect to the cocaine.

The admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Simmons v. State, 760 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). The decision whether to admit evidence will not be reversed absent a showing of manifest abuse of the trial court’s discretion resulting in the denial of a fair trial. Id.; Spires v. State, 670 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996). In determining the admissibility of evidence, the reviewing court will only consider the evidence in favor of the trial court’s ruling and unrefuted evidence in the defendant’s favor. Simmons, 760 N.E.2d at 1158.

In the instant case, we find that the trial court properly overruled Davis’ objection to Kinkade’s testimony. Here, Kinkade testified as a “skilled” witness rather than an “expert” witness. A “skilled” witness is defined as “a person with a degree of knowledge short of that sufficient to be declared an expert under Indiana Rule of Evidence 702, but somewhat beyond that possessed by the ordinary jurors.” O’Neal v. State, 716 N.E.2d 82, 88-9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).1

Under Ind. Evid. R. 701, a skilled witness may testify to an opinion or inference that is:

  1. rationally based on the witness’s perception, and

  1. helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.

Haycraft, 760 N.E.2d at 211. The requirement that the opinion be “rationally based” on perception simply means that the opinion must be one that a reasonable person could normally form from the perceived facts. Id.; Hanson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 152, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The requirement that the opinion be “helpful” means, in part, that the testimony gives substance to facts, which are difficult to articulate. Id.

Here, the State developed a foundation to establish Kinkade’s qualifications to testify about Davis’ possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. At the time of Davis’ trial, Kinkade had been with the Indianapolis Police Department for sixteen years. During his sixteen years on the force, six and one-half years were spent specifically on investigating narcotics crimes. In fact, Kinkade was the detective in charge of the North District Narcotics Unit. He received special training in narcotics that included schooling for the detection and affects of ecstasy, methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, and club drugs. Further, Kinkade was involved in approximately 600–700 narcotics investigations, the majority of which involved cocaine. Moreover, the record shows that the trial court overruled Davis’ objection to Kinkade’s testimony because, “it is relating to the types of investigations he has been in …the training he has received and the years of experience all relay to me the conclusion that he is capable of forming an opinion as to what someone with the quantity package and that weight would intend to do with it….” (Transcript p. 33). Given this background, we find that Kinkade was sufficiently qualified to testify as a skilled witness. See O’Neal, 716 N.E.2d at 88-9; Haycraft, 760 N.E.2d at 211.

Further, Kinkade testified that his opinions and inferences were based on his personal experience as an investigator; thus, his testimony was rationally based on his perception. His testimony was helpful in determining the issue of intent to deliver because Kinkade established the distinct characteristics that differentiate between a drug user and a drug dealer. Specifically, Kinkade testified that drug users generally do not have large amounts of drugs on them. He stated that usually drug users buy $10 to $20 “rocks” of cocaine that weigh approximately .10 grams and immediately smoke it. (Tr. pp. 31, 33, 35). Conversely, the record reflects that Kinkade testified that drug dealers generally carry larger amounts of cocaine on them.

In this case, Davis discarded two plastic baggies of cocaine, each containing an “eight ball” or approximately forty-five rocks of cocaine that were individually wrapped or “bindled.” (Tr. pp. 34). Kinkade concluded from his training and experience that the cocaine was packaged for dealing because it was uncommon for a drug user to carry the amount of cocaine that Davis possessed. The record also indicates that no paraphernalia used to smoke cocaine was found on Davis or near the scene. Clearly, Kinkade’s testimony gave substance to facts that were otherwise difficult to articulate. In particular, Kinkade’s testimony was helpful to determine the intent element of the charge for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. As such, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Kinkade’s testimony as a skilled witness. See Simmons, 760 N.E.2d at 1158; Haycraft, 760 N.E.2d at 211.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Davis contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to establish that he possessed cocaine with the intent to deliver.

Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is well settled. In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, this court does not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Cox v. State, 774 N.E.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment, together with all reasonable and logical inferences that can be drawn therefrom. Alspach v. State, 755 N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. The conviction will be affirmed if there is substantial evidence of probative value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Cox, 774 N.E.2d at 1028-29. A judgment may be sustained based on circumstantial evidence alone if that circumstantial evidence supports a reasonable inference of guilt. Maul v. State, 731 N.E.2d 438, 439 (Ind. 2000).

Indiana Code Section 35-48-4-1(a)(2)(C)(b)(1), in pertinent part, states:

A person who possesses, with intent to deliver cocaine, a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine, pure or adulterated, classified in schedule I or II; commits dealing in cocaine, a narcotic drug, or methamphetamine, a Class A felony if the amount of the drug involved weighs three (3) grams or more.

Therefore, to convict Davis for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, a Class A felony, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Davis possessed cocaine in an amount greater than three grams with intent to deliver it. See I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2)(C)(b)(1).

In the present case, the record reveals that Detective Gorgiveski and Officers Ball, Brannon and Campbell responded to complaints for gambling and narcotic sales in an area near Broadway and College Avenue. Detective Gorgiveski and Officers Ball, Brannon, and Campbell saw Davis drop two plastic baggies containing cocaine. Thereafter, Davis was arrested for possessing approximately 5.6225 grams of crack cocaine with intent to deliver. “Circumstantial evidence showing possession with intent to deliver may support a conviction. Possessing a large amount of a narcotic substance is circumstantial evidence of intent to deliver. The more narcotics a person possesses, the stronger the inference that he intended to deliver it and not consume it personally.” Love v. State, 741 N.E.2d 789, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) quoting Berry v. State, 574 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (citations omitted), trans. denied.

Here, the evidence on the record shows that Davis intended to deliver the cocaine he possessed. Intent, being a mental state, can only be established by considering the behavior of the relevant actor, the surrounding circumstances, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them. See Love, 741 N.E.2d at 792. As stated above, Kinkade’s testimony distinguished the general characteristics of drug users and drug dealers. Specifically, Kinkade testified that drug users generally possess a $10 to $20 rock that weighs approximately .10 grams. However, Kinkade stated that drug dealers typically carry relatively large amounts of cocaine including large numbers of rocks. In the instant case, Davis possessed more than three grams of cocaine. He possessed 5.6225 grams of cocaine. According to Kinkade’s testimony, this amount is consistent with an amount possessed by a dealer, rather than for strictly personal use. Further, the cocaine was individually wrapped in forty-five bindles, creating the inference that the cocaine was packaged for sale rather than for personal use. Evidence of the illegal possession of a relatively large quantity of drugs is sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession with intent to deliver. Hazzard v. State, 642 N.E.2d 1368, 1369 (Ind. 1994). Due to the amount of cocaine that Davis possessed compared to the amount a drug user would typically use, and the fact that the rocks were individually wrapped, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain Davis’ conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. See Love, 741 N.E.2d at 792; I.C. § 35-48-4-1(a)(2)(C)(b)(1).

With the above in mind, we reject Davis’ invitation to reweigh the evidence. It is the trier-of-fact’s prerogative to weigh the credibility of the witnesses and to weigh the evidence. Stephenson v. State, 742 N.E.2d 463, 499 (Ind. 2001). Because there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting Davis’ convictions, we will not reverse the conclusion of the trier of fact. See Cox, 774 N.E.2d at 1028-29.


Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court committed no error in allowing Kinkade’s testimony as a skilled witness. See Simmons, 760 N.E.2d at 1158. Further, we conclude that Davis was properly convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver as a Class A felony. See Cox, 774 N.E.2d at 1028-29.


SHARPNACK, J., and BARNES, J., concur.

So what kind of person does Aaron Haith represent?

When he's not standing behind Gray and whispering in his ear, how about drunken cop killers?



Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana


RANDALL FUGATE,                )


Appellant-Defendant, )


vs. ) No. 49A02-9611-CR-754




Appellee-Plaintiff. )

The Honorable John R. Barney, Jr., Judge
Cause No. 49G03-9109-CF-113618

August 15, 1997



Randall Fugate appeals the revocation of his probation.
We affirm.
The facts favorable to the judgment are that Fugate was convicted of reckless homicide for his involvement in stealing a car and participating in a high-speed police chase that ended in the death of a police officer. The court sentenced Fugate to eight years' imprisonment, suspended two years, and ordered that the suspended portion of the sentence be served on probation. Over a ten-month period while on probation, Fugate 1) was arrested for public intoxication, 2) was charged with possession of alcohol, 3) was arrested for disorderly conduct, 4) failed to attend court-ordered, substance-abuse counseling, and 5) went to Arizona without receiving permission to leave Indiana from his parole officer. After a hearing, the court revoked Fugate's probation.
Applying the relevant standard of review, see Braxton v. State, 651 N.E.2d 268, 270 (Ind. 1995), we conclude that the trial court did not err in revoking Fugate's probation.
Having scrutinized the record for errors of law, appellant's counsel admits that the revocation of Fugate's probation in the instant case was unassailable. Our review of the record confirms counsel's candid assessment. The trial court adhered to all relevant procedural requirements in reaching its decision, and the evidence was more than sufficient to support revocation. We perceive no value in engaging in what would amount to an exercise in futility, i.e., concocting, discussing, and ultimately rejecting possible errors where it is obvious that none exist.
Judgment affirmed.
SULLIVAN, J., and SHARPNACK, C.J., concur

So, is he moving up in the world? /roll eyes

More of this later..

I think we're going to dedicate today to Aaron Haith.

This morning IC brought up a possible conflict of interest to 1430 when Mathew Tully was on there, after some back peddling from him, I think something may have been set in motion. I'll get more specific about this later on, I have some research to do right now.

Please let me know if you can add anything on him that we should post, as you have read, we're well aware of his drinking issues and the suspension as a result of them. IC would have to have a couple of belts to sit behind Gray and pull his strings every time he wants to open his gaping maw.

IC might have a lead on some other items as well, we will see what pans out from that.

Stay tuned, today could get VERY interesting!

P.S. Let me know if anyone has a lead on Andre Carson, I have a gut feeling that IU may break something about this today.. just a gut instinct with the ousting of the little hat man..

Thursday, August 16, 2007

More corruption, more to come soon.

From the Indy Star today: We are trying to keep up with the corruption, but it is hard work.

Lawrence Township Trustee Mike Hobbs was charged today with two felonies on accusations he used fire department money to pay his rent.

Marion County prosecutors filed one count of theft and one count of official misconduct against Hobbs. Both are Class D felonies carrying maximum penalties of three years in prison and a $10,000 fine upon conviction.

Hobbs, 25, obtained a check for $500 from the Castleton Volunteer Fire Department and represented it as a charitable contribution, according to a probable cause affidavit filed in Marion Superior Court. The check, made payable to "Park Harrison," was given by Hobbs to Park Harrison Apartment Complex in February to pay his rent, the affidavit says.

In the check's memo portion, the affidavit says, someone wrote "Lawrence Township Historical Society."

Reached at his office this afternoon, Hobbs said he would call back and quickly hung up. A warrant has been issued for his arrest on $10,000 bond.

Hobbs told an investigator he saw nothing wrong with using the check that way at the time, but said "it does look bad," according the affidavit. Hobbs said Lawrence Township Fire Department Chief Brian Wisehart and an assistant chief, both signatories on the Castleton department's account, gave him the check but didn't know it would be used to pay rent.

"He is a public official. He's entrusted with fund and entrusted with the idea that he is going to handle those funds responsibly," said Barbara Crawford, the prosecutor's chief charging deputy.

In Indiana, elected officials immediately lose their position if they are convicted of a felony. Hobbs, a Democrat, began serving as trustee in January. He previously served in Iraq as a U.S. Marine.

In June, Hobbs was arrested and charged with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a misdemeanor. That charge still is pending in Marion Superior Court.

Crawford said the charging process was handled normally in the new case after an investigation by Indiana State Police. Prosecutor Carl Brizzi is a Republican.

Time for his shanty to go on the block is past due!

We as citizens demand that all people be treated equally, and that this corrupt CCC member be held to the same standards that we as citizens are help to. It's THE LAW!

IC 14-33-10-4
Delinquent tax or assessment
Sec. 4. (a) An assessment is a lien on the real property assessed equal to taxes levied on the property. If an installment of an assessment is not paid when due, the real property is subject to the same rate of interest and penalty as is provided by statute for delinquent taxes. If an installment or assessment is not paid in the amount and at the time when due, the board shall prepare, certify, and file with the auditor of the county in which the real property assessed is located the amount of the assessment against the real property with the default in payment.
(b) The county auditor shall place the amount, together with interest and penalty, upon the tax duplicate to be collected as state and county taxes are collected at the next date for the semiannual payment of taxes. If the assessment, interest, and penalty are not paid at that time, the real property is subject to sale as is provided by statute for the sale of real property on which there are delinquent taxes. Upon the sale the proceeds shall be prorated equally among the assessment and any delinquent taxes. A sale for a delinquent tax or delinquent assessment does not extinguish the assessment.
As added by P.L.1-1995, SEC.26.

Read it for yourself

Patrice Abduallah, time for a Sheriff's sale!!

IC just got off the phone with the Marion County Treasures office, the gal who answered the phone would not give me her name. "lol" Guess I must not have been the first person to call and request information about this.

Here is what she told me:

At any point, if you are delinquent paying your property taxes, your house can be put up for a sheriffs sale. She then back tracked and said you had to be behind one year, then she said one and a half years delinquent. So, if you haven't paid the first installment of last years property taxes, by the second due date this year, your home would be considered for a Sheriff's sale. However, when IC asked her if there were any written law online to review, she stated that it's the sole discretion of the Sheriff's department on which homes action will be taken on.

Now I want you to think about this one real hard here, how many of our CCC members haven't paid property taxes since last year?

The following was posted online at AI, to give credit where it's due.
  • Patrice Abduallah, Democratic City-County Councilor, District 15, 937 N. Sheffield Ave. ($535.21)
  • Rozelle Boyd, Democratic City-County Councilor, At-Large, 938 N. Alabama Street ($2,069.38)
  • Billie J. Breaux, Democratic Marion County Auditor, 5155 N. Arlington Ave. (27.68), 5155 N. Arlington Ave. ($511.54)
  • Lonnell Conley, Democratic City-County Councilor, At-Large, Majority Leader, 6223 E. 56th St. ($1,433.44)
  • Mark Anthony "Tony" Duncan, Democratic Center Township Constable, 340 Harvard Pl. ($1,367.54)
  • Carl Drummer, Democratic Center Township Trustee, 3563 N. Central Ave. ($1,273.40)
The following comes from the Indy star article posted today:

While that work ran into city roadblocks, Abduallah said he has run into serious financial problems that kept him from paying his property taxes last year and again on Friday. Treasurer records show he owes $1,084 in taxes on his house on Sheffield.
"I'm delinquent on those taxes,'' Abduallah said. "I've really been going through some financial hardship recently."

IC wants to know some things, and needs your help!

Permit? We don't need no stinking permits, you poor peasant!

Signed, 300 East maffia.


1) How long do you have to pay your property taxes before "bling bling" is allowed to foreclose on you?

2) Can someone link me to the actual pending cases against Monroe Gray, and his concrete company?

3) How do we get a copy of the billing-payments and charges of Aaron Haith, for the CCC?

IC has been out searching all morning, home for the day and trying to keep busy!

Thank you to anyone who can help me find this items, I am looking and will post anything I find immediately.

Long live the king, the king is dead!

IC has had a rough week, but not as bad as this pinhead.

"City-County Councilman Patrice Abduallah said he plans to resign his seat today after critics hounded him about whether he moved out of the district he represents.

Abduallah, 61, a Democrat elected in the 15th District in 2003, said he made an honest mistake when he listed his mother's home as his residence in council records and on his 2007 candidate forms.

His mother's house, where he is living while rehabbing his own house, is on the west side of the 1100 block of North Warman Avenue in the Haughville area. That puts the home in District 14, represented by Republican Marilyn Pfisterer.

"If it was on the other side of the street, it wouldn't be a problem,'' Abduallah said. "This technicality has cost me my council seat, and I'm upset about it. This situation is a tremendous blow to me."

Local Internet blogs have simmered recently with accusations that Abduallah moved out of his district. In an interview with The Indianapolis Star late Wednesday, he said Democratic Party officials asked him to resign.

Abduallah said it's a shame that pressure from the blogs and the media, rather than his constituents, led Democratic Party leaders to question his residency.

Marion County Democratic Party Chairman Michael O'Connor said he will hold a news conference this morning to address the situation. He said Wednesday evening that he did not know about Abduallah's decision to resign. O'Connor said he couldn't speculate on replacing Abduallah until today.

Deputy Mayor Steve Campbell said past case law indicates Abduallah's recent votes on the council will not be in jeopardy because of his residency status.

"Case law is pretty clear (that Abduallah's residency problem) won't overturn his votes," Campbell said. "It's not the first time it's happened in the history of legislatures.''

But Tom John, the county GOP chairman, said Abduallah's declaration of residency on his candidate form in January raises a host of questions. While stated residency can be difficult to challenge, John said the signed form with an address outside the district makes the case different.

"It's either sloppy or arrogant to not check if your stated address is in your district,'' Tom said. "Either way, he left the residents of District 15 without representation.''

John said council votes since January could be questioned and that Democrats may have lost their chance to name his replacement because of legal time limits.

The home Abduallah previously listed on his candidate and council forms was in the 900 block of North Sheffield Avenue, which is in the 15th District. Abduallah said he has been fighting for months with city inspection officials over the permits he needs to complete the rehab work. He said the city has stopped work 13 times.

While that work ran into city roadblocks, Abduallah said he has run into serious financial problems that kept him from paying his property taxes last year and again on Friday. Treasurer records show he owes $1,084 in taxes on his house on Sheffield.

"I'm delinquent on those taxes,'' Abduallah said. "I've really been going through some financial hardship recently."

He said the rehab work has been "a nightmare," but he recognizes that someone who decides how to spend tax money must also pay it.

"I'm going to pay my fair share because that's how we run the country," he said.

Abduallah said he didn't see any reason to fight to hold on to his seat until after the election because he doesn't want to misrepresent the district. He said Democratic officials want him to resign as soon as possible.

"I don't have an opportunity to correct my mistake," he said.

"It's bad for my family and community. But I'll live on for another day. I'll go out with grace, so maybe I can come back to the council later."

Tuesday, August 14, 2007

This tidbit was contributed by one of our readers, thank you. How can you spin THIS one Steve?

Digging back into the archives came across this blog which recorded what was surely Patrice Abduallah's first call to resign his City County Council seat, way back in 2003.

As noted by kolehardfacts on November 2nd of that year, there was a press release from the Libertarian Party which said the following:

"While reviewing the campaign finance report of Patrice Abduallah (Democrat seeking the City-County Council District 15 seat) that was filed with the Marion County Election board Oct. 17, we noted a donation of $3,450 made to Mr. Abduallah on Sept. 13 by the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC)."

"This donation is inappropriate for the following reasons: "

"GIPC is a 501c3 corporation. All corporations are limited by Indiana law to giving no more than $2,000 combined in a calendar year to all candidates who are seeking local offices. Mr. Abduallah received almost 1½ times that amount."

"Quoting the GIPC’s own website, 'Funding for (GIPC) Action Grants comes from application fees paid to the city by businesses requesting tax abatement.' Most importantly, we believe that some of those public funds may have been used to help fund Mr. Abduallah’s campaign."

"Additionally, Mr. Abduallah’s campaign finance report indicates that there is $755 in cash missing from his campaign fund between April and October. It also lists the repayment of a loan for $500 when no loan has ever been listed in his report."

Was Abduallah delinquent on his property taxes that year, too? Could that explain the $755 discrepancy? Or the $500 'repayment'? Just wondering... If he can't pay his property taxes, he's evidently got money problems.

Abduallah later explained his 'error' (regarding the campaign contribution) by claiming the contribution really same from the "Greater Islamic Progress Committee." Remarkable that the only two references to this organization, in ALL of the billions of webpages indexed by Google, appear in two articles referencing Abdullah's statement. Well there are now three, including this one.

This is is Bart's team playing ball here, folks.

Sunday, August 12, 2007

Aaron Haith why are you the CCC attorney?

Look what our crack internet staff stumbled onto!

 IN THE MATTER OF                 )    CASE NO. 49S00-9711-DI-630



February 28, 2001

Per Curiam

Lawyer Aaron E. Haith was convicted twice of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated and convicted once of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol content of at least .10 percent. Today we find that, by virtue of the acts underlying those convictions, he engaged in criminal acts reflecting adversely on his fitness as a lawyer in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys at Law.
This attorney disciplinary case is now before us for final resolution upon the duly-appointed hearing officer’s findings of fact and conclusions of law. The respondent, pursuant to Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 23(15), has petitioned this Court for review of the hearing officer’s findings and conclusions. Because of the respondent’s petition, our review of this matter is de novo in nature, and will involve a review of the entire record presented. Matter of Warrum, 724 N.E.2d 1097 (Ind. 2000).
We now find that on June 25, 1985, the respondent was convicted of operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) in Marion Municipal Court. The incident leading to that conviction involved a motor vehicle accident that resulted in personal injury. On September 17, 1991, the respondent was convicted of operating a vehicle with .10% or more by weight of alcohol in his blood, a class C misdemeanor, in Marion Municipal Court. On September 29, 1995, the respondent was convicted of OWI, a class A misdemeanor, in Marion Municipal Court. Again, the basis for that conviction was a motor vehicle accident resulting in personal injury. After each conviction, the respondent successfully completed his sentencing requirements, including terms of probation, to the extent ordered. The sentence for the 1991 offense included mandatory alcohol counseling. The 1995 sentence included, as terms of probation, alcohol evaluation and treatment, if necessary. To satisfy those terms, the respondent obtained short-term private substance abuse counseling. The counselor observed the respondent on six occasions between January and July 1996, and concluded that the respondent had an alcohol abuse problem and that he met the diagnostic criteria for alcohol dependency.
The respondent re-initiated contact with the counselor in January of 1999. The counselor’s most recent professional opinion is that the respondent and the community will be best served by the respondent’s abstinence from alcohol, continued professional endeavors, and aggressive outpatient therapy coupled with community-based mutual self-help participation. At hearing, the Commission’s expert witness, a medical doctor specializing in addictions, testified that he concurred with the assessment that the respondent is alcohol dependent. The hearing officer found that the respondent is alcohol dependent. The respondent disputes that finding.
The hearing officer concluded that the respondent violated Ind.Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b) by committing the criminal acts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and operating a vehicle with .10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in his blood. According to the hearing officer, these acts reflected adversely on the respondent’s fitness as a lawyer. The hearing officer also concluded that the Commission failed to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d), which provides that it is professional misconduct to engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.
In his petition for review of the hearing officer’s findings, the respondent argues that his convictions of driving while intoxicated or with illegal levels of alcohol in his blood do not reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer. His misconduct, he contends, must be distinguished from this Court’s prior decisions finding Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) violations for convictions of alcohol-related motor vehicle offenses because the acts at issue in prior cases included attendant misconduct such as failures to abide by courts’ orders of probation, the commission of other acts violative of the Rules of Professional Conduct, or offenses committed by lawyers responsible for enforcement of this state’s laws. To support his argument, the respondent relies on Matter of Oliver, 493 N.E.2d 1237 (Ind. 1986) (lawyer who was serving as special prosecutor found to have committed crime involving “moral turpitude” in violation of Code of Professional Responsibility for conviction of OWI), Matter of Martenet, 674 N.E.2d 549 (Ind. 1996) (violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) for three convictions of OWI, the last occurring while the lawyer’s license was suspended), Matter of Welling, 715 N.E.2d 377 (Ind. 1999) (two OWI convictions and conviction of intimidation in violation of Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b)), and Matter of Coleman, 569 N.E.2d 631 (Ind. 1991) (Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) violation for three OWI convictions, failure to appear at hearing after release on bond, use of client’s funds without authorization). The respondent contends that his three convictions, standing alone and without some subsequent violation of terms of probation, do not reflect adversely on his fitness as a lawyer.
We disagree. Lawyers are professionally bound to comply with and uphold the law. Ind.Admission and Discipline Rule 22. A pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of minor significance when considered separately, can indicate an indifference to legal obligation. Comment to Prof.Cond.R. 8.4. A lawyer’s multiple convictions for OWI or similar offenses may indicate a willingness to ignore the law and may damage the public’s perception of the legal profession. Welling, 715 N.E.2d at 378. Such conduct also implicates a lawyer’s fitness as one who can be trusted to keep his client’s secrets, give effective legal advice, and fulfill his obligations to the courts. Martenet, 674 N.E.2d at 550. Thus, a lawyer’s commission of OWI and similar offenses, even standing alone with no attendant misconduct, have been found to violate Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b). Matter of Jones, 727 N.E.2d 711 (Ind. 2000) (three OWI convictions and a fourth conviction withheld on terms of probation). Further, even considered separately, the respondent’s offenses are not minor, given that two of the three involved personal injury. Accordingly, we find that the respondent violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b). We adopt the hearing officer’s finding with respect to the Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(d) charge.
Having found misconduct, we now turn to the issue of proper sanction. Relevant to this determination is the hearing officer’s identification of several aggravating factors. Among these are the respondent’s failure to abstain from the use of alcohol or to acknowledge his alcohol dependency and his failure voluntarily to seek long-term treatment. In mitigation, the hearing officer noted that the respondent, prior to the present action, has practiced law for 20 years with no prior disciplinary history, that he completed his criminal probation successfully, and that he generally enjoys a good reputation in the legal community. The hearing officer recommended that the respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months; that after serving one (1) month of that suspension, the respondent be conditionally reinstated and placed on probation for two (2) years; and that the respondent be fully reinstated to the practice of law upon compliance with the terms and conditions of probation. According to the hearing officer, those terms and conditions should include abstinence from alcohol use, supervision by a monitor, reporting requirements, random substance screenings, intensive out-patient treatment, and psychological evaluation and treatment.
In recent cases involving similar misconduct, pursuant to agreed resolutions this Court has imposed six month suspensions from the practice of law, with some or all of that period stayed to terms of agreed probation aimed at treating the respondents’ alcohol dependencies. See, e.g., Martenet, supra (six month suspension all stayed to aftercare), Welling, supra (six month suspension with four months conditionally stayed), Jones, supra (six month suspension conditionally stayed to period of suspension to run concurently with criminal probation). We conclude that a similar sanction is appropriate in this case as well; however, we find further that the respondent’s failure to abstain from alcohol use and his reluctance to admit his alcohol dependency warrant in this case a lengthier period of suspension stayed to stringent aftercare provisions.
It is, therefore, ordered that the respondent, Aaron E. Haith, be suspended from the practice of law in this state for a period of twelve (12) months, effective immediately. That period of suspension is conditionally stayed to a two (2) year period of probation. During that period of probation, the respondent must:
Remain free from alcohol use
Be subject to the supervision of a monitor approved by the Disciplinary Commission, with periodic meetings with the monitor who will provide regular reports to the Disciplinary Commission
Participate in an intensive out-patient treatment program approved by the Disciplinary Commission
Participate in psychological evaluation and treatment, as recommended by the out-patient treatment program
Participate in Alcoholics Anonymous or similar 12-step program
Agree to be subject to and receive random alcohol and drug screenings
Agree to a waiver of all assertions of confidentiality or privilege associated with his monitor or treating health care providers
Immediately report any noncompliance with the terms of this probation to the Disciplinary Commission
Pay all costs of compliance associated with the terms of probation.

Should the respondent violate any terms of his probation, he shall be required to serve the twelve month period of suspension which was originally stayed, at the conclusion of which he shall be required to petition this Court should he desire reinstatement. Should he successfully complete the two year period of probation, at the end of that period he shall be fully reinstated to the practice of law in this state.
The Clerk of this Court is further directed to provide notice of this order in accordance with Admis.Disc.R. 23(3)(d) and to provide the clerk of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the clerk of each of the United States District Courts in this state, and the clerks of the United States Bankruptcy Courts in this state with the last known address of respondent as reflected in the records of the Clerk.
Costs of this proceeding are assessed against the respondent.

SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON, J., dissent from the sanction imposed, and would impose a sanction calling for a period of executed suspension in addition to a period of suspension stayed to aftercare provisions.

SHEPARD, Chief Justice, dissenting.

Several decades of research about healing chemically impaired people suggests that therapy is typically unsuccessful when a dependent person believes he is not. Formal analysis thus coincides with intuition: people who think treatment is unnecessary are unlikely to work very hard at it.
The present case involves a lawyer who is generally well liked and successful. But, he has had three criminal convictions for drunk driving in twelve years. His own therapist, the Commission’s medical expert, and our hearing officer have all concluded that he is alcohol dependent. He insists he is not. He also maintains that the evidence does not reflect adversely on his fitness to serve clients.
The Court says it disagrees on both points, but it sends this message so softly it seems unlikely the respondent will hear it. A short period of actual suspension seems more likely to lead to a successful result.

Old days, same as the new days!

Indianapolis may not be an exceptionally corrupt U. S. city, yet last week it found itself in a situation even more idiotic than a game of button-button-who's-got-the-button into which a rowdy player has inserted a second button. Last week, Indianapolis had four "mayors."

It all began some years ago when Indianapolis welcomed the Ku Klux Klan. The Klan brought gutter politics. Last month Mayor John L. Duvall of Indianapolis was found guilty of corrupt office-getting in his 1925 election. The City Council asked him to resign. He refused, and appointed his wife City Comptroller. In Indianapolis, the City Comptroller automatically succeeds the mayor should anything happen to him.

Last week John L. Duvall felt that something was going to happen to him, so he put his resignation in the mail. Mrs. Duvall then served as mayor—for 15 minutes—long enough to appoint a new City Comptroller and then resign herself. Her appointee was one Ira M. Holmes, lawyer.

The Duvalls and Lawyer Holmes performed this shuffling before the City Council knew what they were up to; before the Council formally ousted Mayor Duvall and named Council President Claude E. Negley as mayor pro tempore.

That evening, Mr. Duvall ordered a burly police squad to guard "Mayor" Holmes's office against invasion by "Mayor" Negley. When "Mayor" Negley arrived in the morning, he found that "Mayor" Holmes had gone out for breakfast after an early morning vigil. Mrs. Holmes sat in her husband's chair, jealously immovable. "Mayor" Negley eyed her dubiously and loitered around the office. In his pocket he had a court injunction, temporarily restraining "Mayor" Holmes from functioning.

Then "Mayor" Holmes came in from breakfast, "Mayor" Negley grinned with relief. He flourished his injunction. "Mayor" Holmes grinned. Joking, giggling, each "mayor" drew a chair up to the mayoral desk and sat down.

"Mayor" Negley made a speech. "I think I'm Mayor. I appreciate the honor the council has bestowed on me in making me Mayor for a short time. I realize the responsibility that rests on my shoulders. I realize I will not be able to handle the situation by myself. I am going to consult with the various boards. . . ."

"Mayor" Holmes strolled away and made a speech himself. "I'm Mayor of Indianapolis, but I do not propose to function or interfere in any way with Mayor Negley till 10 o'clock tomorrow. Then I'll say to him: 'Come on over and sit down, Claude.' "

Two other "mayors" of Indianapolis were one Joseph Hogue and one Walter Myers. They contended that, by Mayor Duvall's conviction, his election in 1925 was voided. Joseph Hogue claimed office on the ground that he was City Comptroller in the administration of John L. Duvall's immediate predecessor, the late Lew Shank. Walter Myers claimed office because he ran second to John L. Duvall in the 1925 election.

Remembering some of the good old days of corruption.

CITY POLICE CORRUPTION EXPOSED bannered in the Indianapolis Star on the last Sunday in February. The steamy series (60 installments are planned) has so far lived up to its billing. Among Star allegations: many officers are involved in prostitution, both as paid "protectors" and nonpaying patrons. Police shakedowns of drug pushers and users are "a way of life" in the Indianapolis underworld. Some policemen regularly traffic in stolen goods.

Such findings are the yield of six months of hard digging by three Star reporters: Bill Anderson, 48, Harley Bierce, 32, Dick Cady, 33, assisted by Photographer Jerry Clark, 34. The quartet depended heavily on clandestine meetings with over 400 informants, nearly 60 of them policemen. They tape-recorded every scrap of information. The work had its hazards: the reporters were often trailed by the police, and telephoned threats became common.

Public Shock. The story posed another kind of problem for Star Publisher Eugene C. Pulliam, 84, and his son Eugene S., 59, assistant publisher of both the Star and the Indianapolis News. For six years their conservative papers have firmly backed Republican Mayor Richard Lugar, and the exposé came just as Lugar was launching a senatorial campaign against Democratic Incumbent Birch Bayh, a Pulliam target.

The Star did hold up publication for two months so that the FBI could look into the evidence for possible federal violations. Despite the embarrassment to Lugar, the younger Pulliam decided the story could wait no longer. "It's more important," he told Star Managing Editor Bob Early, "to clean up a corrupt police department than to worry about winning an election."

As public shock at the series spread, Lugar defensively pointed out the difference between an anonymous tipster and a grand-jury witness. He said citizens had sometimes brought him charges similar to those running in the Star. "When I've asked them to testify under oath before the Marion County grand jury," he complained, "many disappear." But Lugar's problem did not. Questions about police corruption began popping up at speeches given well outside Indianapolis, and Lugar decided to deal with the issue at home. He formed a seven-man committee to study the police department, began interviewing some policemen himself. Finally, he fired the chief of police, a deputy and the city safety director. Then the mayor brought in a former Secret Service agent to clean house.

Lugar readily admits that the Star series goaded him into action. Despite the police department's success at solving homicide cases and curbing violent crime, corruption in the force has been an open Secret in Indianapolis for years. Lugar says that "in my six years we've removed ten people from the police department, and this is not an easy thing to do." The Star has made it easier for the mayor, and Assistant Publisher Pulliam thinks that the series may even boost Lugar's election chances: "It has given him name recognition he never had before."

Wikopedia mess from today!

IC wants to know who's going to honor the warranties on city cars from Payton Wells?

After looking through the city pages, it appears that every car purchased from this crook came with an extended warranty. You know, that thing all of us are not stupid enough to buy. IC will link to an example of how this fleecing worked, check out the line item charges.. :)


IC also would like to know if any of the employees were paid, and happened to their 401k?

This is a clip from a concerned wife of one of his former employees, and I don't give a flying two shits about the bank foreclosing, you know way before that and should have been honest enough to give some notice.

"My husband was a very long time, well known, and much liked employee of Payton Wells for 11 years. He was loyal until the doors closed although Payton did not return the loyalty to him or Kevin Kimbrough. I personally know that issues with payoffs and paperwork were also extremely frustrating for all who worked at the Anderson dealership since the payoffs were generated from the top with little control from below. Kevin was told abruptly to call a meeting for the staff and inform them that they had 1 hr to get their personal belongings. Those driving demos were stranded for rides, many employees could not even clean out their desks, not to mention the service area personnel were left not knowing how they would remove all of the tools and equipment that belonged to them. Employees were not permitted back on the lot after they left. The let down continues as we don't know about issues such as if our health insurance coverage is going to continue, 401 K status, etc. It has been weeks and we still don't know anything. My husband's calls have gone unreturned. He has worked very hard for 11 years to establish a large customer base, as well as a great reputation as a fair and caring dealer, and a respected member of the community. He was a high flying kite for the company and his life's string was severed without notice. He was left to the winds of uncertainty without a second thought. He will relocate, rebuild, and rebound because he is truly a high flyer destined to reach star status. I am very proud of him. I wish I could say the same for Payton Wells. I wish luck to all the former employees and hope that the community can have some relief in knowing that not all car dealers are bad or out to rip you off and that some things are beyond the control of the employee. Although there will always be shady folks in sales, most people in this business really do want to provide you a great experience and a fair price for a service that we all need- the purchase of a vehicle. Top Salesman's wife"

Good thing Frank "Bling bling" came to your rescue, IC's looking for that contract at the Marion County Jail right now.. you know.. the one.. that involves food.. Here we come Franky, here we come brother.

Monroe, are you planning some new concrete work?

200 East Washington Street, Suite 1501
Indianapolis, IN 46204
(317) 327-5262
Web Address:

IC would like to know how your business is listed as a minority owned company, and approved vendor for the city?

Link here for the PDF file.

So, look here you freaking retard.. if you're too stupid to realize your juice couldn't fleece us fast enough to cut and run. How are we supposed to honestly think you're capable of remaining president of the CCC? Is that why Haith has to come down there and whisper in your ear before you speak? We're beginning to think so, tell us why it is that you need to be an approved vendor when your company can't even cover the bad checks, and wages owed? MORON!

We can always hope!

IC just got a special delivery, then had to run out to pass out the "Had Enough" signs all over the neighborhood. After coming back and cooling off, a moment of inspiration happened to occur.

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